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Cooperation, Competition, Conflict 
and Communication 
 
Jens Allwood 
Dept of Linguistics, Göteborg University 
 
 
1. What is cooperation? 
 
As we have seen in chapter 1, there have been several attempts to characterize what 
cooperation is, since John Owen introduced the concept in the beginning of the 19:th 
century. Some of the most notable of these were Peter Kropotkin's (1902) treatise on 
mutual aid and Axelrod’s notion of “tit for tat” (Axelrod 2001). In the field of 
language and communication, an important contribution was made by Grice (1975) 
where an explication of communication as cooperative was made through the 
proposal of four maxims of rational communication which Grice, inspired by Kant, 
(Kant 1964), called the maxims of quality, relation, quantity and manner.  
 
Building on sources such as the ones mentioned our point of departure, in this book, 
is the definition of cooperation given in Allwood (1976). Cooperation is there 
claimed to be a matter of degree, definable in terms of four requirements that would 
be needed to achieve ideal cooperation. Thus, two or more parties interact 
cooperatively to the extent that they in their actions 
 
(i)  take each other into cognitive consideration 
(ii)  have a joint purpose 
(iii)         take each other into ethical consideration 
(iv)      trust each other to act in accordance with (i) – (iii). 
 
All four requirements need not be met, but as soon as one is met, there is some 
degree of cooperation and two persons may be said to cooperate to some extent. 
 
 
2.  How is cooperation related to communication? 
 
Normal communication is cooperative since it requires at least the following two of 
the conditions to be met: 
 
(i) the parties in their actions take each other into cognitive consideration in 
order to achieve 
(ii) the joint purpose of understanding 
 
Taking the other person into cognitive consideration is necessary in order to make 
sure that the information reaches him/her and is shared. Both “cognitive 
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consideration” and “sharing” can conceptually be further refined in a number of 
ways.  “Cognitive consideration” could, for example, be specified as to which level 
of awareness and intentionality the reactions and processes which are involved occur.  
It could also be specified as to whether these processes involve the considering 
agent’s perception, emotion, cognitive attitudes or factual reasoning.  Further, the 
object that is cognitively considered could be specified as to whether it is inanimate 
or animate, capable of agency.  When using cognitive consideration in order to 
analyze what is involved in cooperation, the object will normally either be an entity 
capable of agency (like another person) or some property, behavior or object directly 
connected with such an entity.  Thus, we normally do not cooperate with stones, 
assuming that they are not capable of agency, but with persons. 
 
In a similar way, the concept of “sharing” can also be further specified. This is 
important since sharing is fundamental to communication which as we have seen can 
be defined as “sharing of information”.  In the most general sense, any similarity 
between two entities with regard to some property P might be described as the two 
entities sharing the property P; e.g. two cars might share the property of being red. A 
special case of this occurs when the property involves two or more agents having the 
same relation to the same object (token). Relations of interest for dialog analysis are 
primarily perceptual and cognitive attitudes but could also be possession, physical 
contact, or causal control, e.g. sharing awareness of some information or sharing 
consumption of some meal.  Another aspect concerns the degree of mutual awareness 
of the sharing. For some purposes, it is not enough that all parties merely have the 
same relation to the same object, the parties must also have an awareness of the 
relationship. Thus, we can distinguish different levels of sharing depending on 
whether one or more participants have this awareness, and whether there is also 
awareness of this awareness.  A third aspect relates to whether the object that is 
being shared is contributed by one, several or all of the sharing parties.  Thus, I can 
share your beliefs or worries without it necessarily being the case that you share 
mine.  We might now say that “mutual sharing” occurs if and only if all involved 
parties have contributed to the object of sharing. “Sharing” without the qualification 
“mutual”, can then occur even if only one party has contributed to what is being 
shared.  
 
Communication can involve “one-way sharing”, as in radio broadcasts. It can also be 
two-way, where both parties cognitively consider each other. However, mutual 
consideration alone would not be sufficient if both parties made each other 
understand totally different things. This would be what might be called “double one-
way communication”. The goals of both parties have to be related to each other. For 
this, the parties must take each other's purpose into account and manifest this in their 
response. Two-way communication is thus cooperative in the sense of involving 
mutual cognitive consideration and the goal of mutually shared understanding of a 
minimum of at least two related contributions. Two-way communication occurs even 
if the second responding contribution is negative since a negative reply also shows 
cognitive consideration of the other party and the goal of mutual understanding and, 
thus, as we shall see below, provides a starting point for ethical consideration and 
trust.  
 
Also the notion of a “joint purpose” like that of “cognitive consideration” can be 
subjected to further analysis.  The type of joint purpose we are dealing with depends, 
for example, on the following dimensions: 
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1. Degree of mutual contribution to shared purpose: Has the shared purpose 
been contributed by one, several or all involved parties? 
 
2. Degree of mutual awareness of shared purpose: Have all concerned parties 
perceived and understood that other parties have the same purpose, i.e. one 
might well have the same purpose as another person without being aware of 
this fact. 
 
3. Degree of agreement reached concerning the purpose: Have the parties 
entered into an agreement concerning working toward the purpose. 
 
4. Degree of dependence between purposes: Does the achievement of one 
party's purpose depend on another party also achieving their purpose.  
 
5. Degree of antagonism between the purposes: Are the purposes of the parties 
antagonistic.  
 
Variation in what we can be meant by a joint purpose can occur along all 5 
dimensions.  We will consider the cases one by one.  If A gives B an order to help 
him and B decides to comply, the two parties share a unilaterally contributed purpose 
and could be said to engage in one-way cooperation.  In cases of this type, it is not 
uncommon to say that B is being cooperative, i.e. complying with the purpose 
contributed by A. This use of “cooperative” might even be extended to inanimate 
objects so that we might say, for example, that a car is being uncooperative, if it will 
not start. It is worth noting that the term “compliance”, in many studies is equated 
with the term “cooperation” and that it is not uncommon in the business world to use 
the term “team player” for someone who quickly agrees with given directions and 
moves toward completing the task. We will discuss this relationship a little more in 
detail in chapter 5.  
 
Secondly, variation might also occur according to how aware we are of sharing a 
purpose with other people.  Having the same purpose as another person does not 
mean that we automatically are aware of this fact. In line with this, one of the ways 
to achieve a successful negotiation is to have a discussion between the negotiating 
parties concerning what they have in common, specifically concerning what common 
goals they want to reach (Fisher and Ury 1983). Since they may discover that they 
have goals or preferences in common that they were unaware of, all parties gain 
without giving in or making any concessions. 
 
Thirdly, there is a distinction to be made between being mutually aware of having the 
same purpose and having agreed to have the same purpose.  You and I might both be 
aware that we both want to terminate a discussion without having agreed to this.  
Such tacit understandings are common, but they are also a potential source of 
problems when people assume a commonality that later proves to be only weakly 
present or not present at all. 
 
Fourthly, we can distinguish cases where we can both achieve the same purpose 
independently of the other person (e.g. you and I can independently leave a meeting) 
from cases where my achieving my purpose is dependent on you achieving the same 
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purpose, (e.g. two-way communication is only possible if both parties share this 
purpose). 
 
Finally, purposes can be more or less antagonistic.  For example, if A and B share the 
abstract purpose of wanting to hurt the other person (“I want to hurt you”), the 
deictically anchored versions of this purpose will be antagonistic, even if the abstract 
formulation is shared,  
 
When “cognitive consideration”, “sharing” and “joint purpose” are used below, we 
will, when necessary, make use of these various possible ways of specifying the 
concepts that we have pointed to.  
 
If communication is used for conflict, at least cognitive consideration will always be 
involved. This is required in order to effectively hurt the other party. Without shared 
understanding and a relevant response, we would, however, have one-way conflictual 
communication. In order to have conflictual two-way communication, as shown for 
example, in the analysis of a quarrel (in chapter 8, below), joint understanding and a 
relevant response must also be involved. In this type of conflict, the purpose seems to 
be that both parties should understand that (and how) the other party has been hurt. 
 
 
3. Ethics and cooperation  
 
Even though communication can sometimes be used to pursue conflicts, at other 
times communication can also be cooperative in the sense of involving ethical 
consideration and trust. When it involves ethical consideration, this means that the 
parties act according to the following maxims (cf. Allwood 1976 and 1995a). Each 
maxim is first formulated negatively and then followed by a positive and stronger 
formulation in brackets. The difference between the two formulations corresponds to 
a negative and a positive formulation of the “Golden rule”, i.e. “do not do to others 
what you would not like them to do to you” versus “ do to others what you would 
like them to do to “. 
 
(i) They try not to force each other (make it possible for the other party to act 
freely). 
 
(ii They try not to prevent each other from pursuing their own motives (help 
each other to achieve their motives).  Since the urge to escape pain and to 
seek pleasure is perhaps the strongest of all human motives, this means that 
they should try not to hurt each other (make it possible for the other party to 
seek pleasure). 
 
(ii They try not to prevent each other from exercising rationality successfully 
(make it possible for the other party to exercise rationality successfully).  
Since correct information, at least in the long run, is a precondition of 
successful rational action they should not lie but give each other adequate and 
correct information. 
Ethical consideration involves having ethical goals, making ethical decisions and 
acting ethically but it can also be seen as connected with general obligations to act in 
this manner. Even if the desire to behave in this manner changes, the obligations may 
 5 
persist, sometimes bringing with them social sanctions for failure to comply, cf. 
Allwood (1994). 
 
Let us now examine the properties of ethical communication in some more detail.  In 
order to make it possible for others to be agents, we should refrain from imposing on 
them too much, instead leaving them the freedom to act according to their own will 
and intention.  This is one of the sources of politeness.  It is usually more polite to 
make an indirect request such as could you pass me the salt than a direct request as 
pass me the salt since the former in its formulation, even if not always in actual 
usage, gives the interlocutor somewhat greater degrees of freedom than the latter. 
 
Making it possible for others to be agents is also what allows us to claim that 
“brainwashing” and many kinds of propaganda are unethical.  They are unethical 
since they remove the recipient’s possibilities to exercise his/her own critical 
judgement and in this way reduce the recipient’s possibilities of being an agent. 
 
Secondly, ethical communication implies that we should make it possible for others 
to pursue their own motives.   A very fundamental type of motive is related to pain 
and pleasure. Another is related to power, cf. Allwood (1980).  People generally 
want to escape pain and seek pleasure. Thus, in our communicating, we should not 
unnecessarily hurt people but, if possible, rather give them joy.  Here we have 
another source of politeness strategies.  It is usually more polite to compliment 
people than to insult them.  We also see one of the reasons for why so much of 
communication has a consensus orientation.  We do not wish to hurt others, 
especially if they have more power than we do and even if they do not have power, 
they might have it in the future, so one way of understanding ethical communication 
is to treat another as if they might someday be your boss.  The implementation of 
ethics is in this case and in others, strongly aided by the reliance on a principle of 
reciprocity of which the golden rule is an example but also by extending it to a 
principle of negative reciprocity introducing such things as revenge and what might 
happen if you don’t follow the golden rule. In other words, if you hurt others they 
might hurt you later on, whereas if you treat them well, they might treat you well. 
 
Thirdly, ethical communication in the analysis proposed here, involves making it 
possible for others to be rational, i.e. they should be able to act adequately and 
competently.  In order successfully to act adequately and competently, we must have 
correct information, otherwise we cannot judge if the appropriate preconditions for a 
certain course of action are present.  This directly implies that we should not lie or 
mislead.  If we do this, the other person’s possibilities of obtaining the desired 
outcomes through the exercise of his/her rationality are radically diminished. This 
does not mean that rational action has to be based on correct information. Rational 
action can be based on both correct and incorrect information. It only means that the 
likelihood of successfully achieving one’s goal, in the long run, is greater if action is 
based on correct rather than incorrect information. 
 
 
 
4. Trust 
 
If the parties, in addition to having ethical consideration for each other also trust each 
other, this means that they believe that the other communicators are cognitively and 
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ethically considering them as well in trying to achieve common understanding or 
other joint purposes. Just like the concepts of “cognitive consideration” and “joint 
purpose” discussed earlier, the concept of “trust” can be specified in several ways.  
Two of these are the scope of trust and the motives for trust.   
 
Concerning the scope of trust we might distinguish partial trust from more holistic 
trust.  We can trust B as a carpenter without trusting him more holistically as a 
human being.  We might trust him to renovate a room properly without trusting him 
to carry a large cash deposit that we haven’t counted to the bank.  It is this latter 
holistic sense we have in mind in the definition of “ideal cooperation”, even though 
the partial sense will also be involved in many cases.   
 
The concept of trust is also dependent on what motives lie behind the expected 
behavior of the trustee.  Is he/she motivated by fear of sanctions, by self-interest or 
by a wish to behave cooperatively for ethical reasons?  In the case of ideal 
cooperation it is this latter motive which is the focus, even though in cases of less 
ideal cooperation the other motives might well be involved. 
 
Thus, it might be very reasonable to trust (in the partial sense) even an enemy or 
neutral party to act in a certain way, to the degree that it is in that party's own interest 
(assuming the party is rational). However, such trust would most rationally dissolve 
in the case of a change in that party's interests. One might also trust in some agent 
behaving in a socially acceptable or ethically considerate way, even against that 
agent's own desire, given a fear of sanctions or a sense of moral responsibility. Trust 
in the more holistic ethically ideal sense, would be involved if we trust another 
person to further our goals out of a sense that the person is truly cooperative, even in 
the absence of self interest or fear of sanctions. 
 
We may now consider the question of whether the conditions we have associated 
with trust could be achieved (e.g. by cognitive consideration alone) without adding 
an explicit requirement of trust on ideal cooperation. To discuss this let us again 
consider the relationship between trust and the first three levels of cooperation 
(cognitive consideration, joint purpose and ethical consideration). “Trust” requires 
not only that the parties themselves meet conditions (i) – (iii) but also that they 
expect and rely on other parties to do the same. This requirement, for example, 
excludes a situation where A and B by cognitively considering each other arrive at 
the conclusion that the other party is not cognitively considering them. This situation 
would, however, be allowed without the requirement of “trust”. Similarly, it excludes 
a situation in which A and B are both working for the same purpose while believing 
that the other party is not, or a situation where both parties are ethically considering 
each other while believing that the other party is not doing so. Thus, if these 
possibilities are to be excluded as incompatible with ideal cooperation and/or ideal 
communication, a requirement of trust is needed.  
 
On the other hand it is also true that A through cognitive consideration could arrive 
at the conclusion that B considers him/her cognitively or ethically or shares the same 
purpose. But this conclusion is not necessary. It only follows given a number of extra 
assumptions about the nature of B’s actions (e.g. that he is ethical or has the same 
purpose as A). If A is able to make these assumptions, he/she probably also will trust 
B and meet condition (iv) of ideal cooperation. 
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More in general, the four requirements on cooperation are related to each other in the 
following way: 
 
Cognitive consideration is basic and requires no other requirement to be met.  
Similarly, the parties can have the same purpose without being aware of this, i.e., 
without cognitively considering each other.  Ethical consideration, however, requires 
cognitive consideration but ads attitudes and behavior not given by cognitive 
consideration alone.  Similarly, trust requires a certain amount of cognitive 
consideration but, as discussed above, adds expectations not necessarily given by 
cognitive consideration alone. 
 
 
5. Cooperation, collaboration and working together  
 
From a historical point of view the word (and the concept) “ cooperation “ comes 
from the Latin “co-operare “ (to work together).  So from the point of view of origin 
“ cooperating “, “ collaborating “ and “ working together “ more or less express the 
same idea.  However, over time the three expressions have become differentiated.  
Because of their Latin origin, the words “ cooperate “ and “ collaborate “ have 
become slightly more specialized and abstract then the expression “ working 
together”  which is in keeping with the Anglo-Saxon origin of the latter expression 
and gives it a more concrete, “down-to-earth” sense.   
 
Let us now discuss in somewhat more detail the relationship between “cooperate”,  
“collaborate” and “coordinate”. First, it should be said that the use of the three terms 
overlaps in ordinary language, especially between the two terms cooperation and 
collaboration.  This means that any attempt to distinguish them must be partly 
stipulative. 
 
It seems clear that coordination involves the least requirements on mutual relations 
between the interacting parties.  On the scale proposed above, the lowest degree of 
cooperation, (i) taking each other into cognitive consideration, could therefore be 
called coordination.  It is thus cooperation in the sense of coordination that is 
presupposed for conflict.  Turning to collaboration, this term can also be said to pose 
fewer requirements on the mutual relations between the interacting parties than 
cooperation.  People can arguably be “collaborators” without trusting each other, 
and, without being ethically committed to each other. This can be seen in the use of 
the term collaborator to denote people who are working with an oppressive regime 
e.g. Nazi collaborators, or the use of the term by a boss to designate his employees 
or business contacts.  We therefore suggest that collaboration could be used for 
interaction which combines criteria (i) and (ii), i.e. cognitive consideration and 
having a joint purpose or mutual goal.  We can see this also in some of the proposed 
explicit definitions of collaboration or proposed in the AI literature, for example, 
Grosz and Sidner (1990), and Cohen and Levesque (1991).  Some, (e.g., Clark and 
Wilkes-Gibbs 1986, Grosz and Sidner 1990), however, use the term collaboration 
rather than cooperation to describe the driving force behind dialog. While some 
notion of collaboration or teamwork  (Cohen and Levesque 1990) could be sufficient 
to account for much of the interaction in task oriented dialogs focused on a joint 
purpose, a stronger notion, including also ethical commitment and trust, is needed to 
account for the more general level of coordination and coherence in dialog, which to 
some extent can be present even in situations of conflict. 
 8 
 
The term cooperation more naturally than collaboration seems to encompass states 
where the parties are ethically committed to each other, trust each other and have a 
more or less egalitarian (in terms of social power) relationship to each other.  If this 
suggestion can be accepted, the term cooperation would function similarly to 
adjectives like long, old and big which cover both a dimension as a whole and a 
specific part of that dimension.  You can ask of a baby how old he/she is and get the 
answer - 3 days old.  But you can also say of a person who has passed middle age 
that he/she is old.  In the same vein, cooperation would cover coordination and 
collaboration but also be the preferred term for types of interaction involving more 
demanding aspects of the scale, such as ethical commitments, trust and egalitarian 
social relationships. 
 
 
6. How is cooperation related to competition and conflict? 
 
Cooperation, competition and conflict are usually not pursued for their own sake.  
We don't cooperate just in order to cooperate.  We cooperate in order to achieve 
some other purpose.  Similarly, we usually don't compete just for the sake of 
competition.  We compete in order to gain control of some resource for which there 
are several contenders.  In the same way, we usually don't pursue conflict for the 
sake of conflict but because we have a conflict with regard to some issue or interest.   
 
Cooperation, competition and conflict are therefore usually not social activities in 
their own right.  Rather they are alternate modes of the interaction in some more 
basic underlying social activity.  For example, if two people are writing a paper 
together, their interaction might alternate from being truly cooperative to being 
competitive or, in the worst case, even conflictual. Thus, all three modes of 
interaction usually presuppose another activity and purpose which they are 
concerned with.   
 
Let us now try to characterize the three modes of interaction in relation to each other, 
taking as our point of departure the definition of “cooperation” given above.  As we 
may remember “ideal cooperation” was there defined as interactive activity in the 
service of a joint goal characterized by cognitive consideration, ethical consideration 
and trust.  Using these four characteristics of “ideal cooperation”, let us now try to 
contrastively characterize “competition” and “conflict”.   
 
Competition like cooperation requires “ cognitive consideration “.  You have to 
perceive and to some extent understand another person in order to compete with him 
or her.  However, a difference appears when we come to the joint goal which is 
characteristic of cooperation.  Rather than being truly joint, the goal is now 
individualized and relativized through comparison with another party.  The goal no 
longer is, “we should sell as much as possible for our company” rather it becomes “I 
should sell more than you for our company” .  The company might well benefit from 
both modes of interaction but it should be intuitively clear that a cooperative and a 
competitive modal interaction in order to increase sales are different.  When it comes 
to “ ethical consideration” , things of not so clear.  Competitors may be ethically 
considerate of each other or they may not. The consequences of competition are not 
clear in this respect even though there often are rules which will constrain the 
possibilities for unethical behavior in competition. In same way, “competition” has 
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no clear relation to “trust”.  Competitors may trust each other or they may not. 
Whether there is trust or not depends on many contextual factors, including rules and 
regulations, which are not directly related to the nature of competition itself.   
 
Turning to “conflict”, conflict like competition usually requires “cognitive 
consideration”.  You cannot hurt somebody unless you know and to some extent 
understand what they're up to.  So all three modes cooperation, competition and 
conflict are coordinated forms of interaction, requiring some form of “cognitive 
consideration”.  As with competition, a difference appears with regard to “the goal” 
of the interaction.  In cooperation, the goal is joint.  In competition, the goal is 
similar but incompatible on an individual level.  In conflict, the common goal has 
usually disappeared, diminished in importance or changed into a pursuit of 
incompatible goals.  A clearer difference appears with regard to “ethical 
consideration”.  This feature, which is one of the features of ideal cooperation that 
becomes toned down and unclear in competition loses its importance in conflict. One 
might almost say that it turns to its opposite - unethical consideration.  Persons who 
are in conflict usually behave unethically to each other by trying to hurt each other, 
trying to restrict each other's freedom and often tell each other lies. The difference 
we have observed with regard to ethical consideration persists when we consider 
“trust”.  Ideal cooperators trust each other.  In competition, things become unclear.  
In conflict, trust usually turns to its opposite.  Conflicting parties usually intensely 
distrust each other and try to obstruct or avoid the other party.   
 
The figure below summarizes the relationship between cooperation, competition and 
conflict we have discussed above.  
 
Figure 1: the relationship between cooperation, competition and conflict  
 
Mode of 
interaction 
-------------------- 
Constitutive 
feature  
 Cooperation  Competition  Conflict 
Cognitive 
consideration 
 yes  yes  yes 
  Joint goal  yes  Similar but 
individually 
incompatible 
 Defocused –often 
incompatible 
 Ethical 
consideration  
 yes   yes?  No – unethical 
actions 
 Trust  yes  no?  no –  distrust 
 
 
Another question that should be addressed in discussing the relationship between 
cooperation, competition and conflict is the question of whether the three modes of 
interaction are “one way” or “two-way”.  All three modes of interaction are primarily 
interactive, i. e. “two-way”.  Stretching the concepts, they can perhaps all three be 
made non-interactive, i.e. “one-way”. This stretching is most forced with the concept 
of cooperation although A can in some sense cooperate with B without it being the 
case that B is cooperating with A. Turning to competition and conflict, the stretching 
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is more natural A can compete with B without it being the case that B is competing 
with A. Similarly, A can be in conflict with B without it being the case that B is in 
conflict with A. Competition and conflict are both more naturally one-sided than 
cooperation. The three concepts of “cooperation”, “competition” and “conflict” are 
here different from the concept of “giving” which is primarily one-way but can be 
extended into two-way or reciprocal giving. (This concept was developed by 
Boulding (1973). 
  
 
7. An activity model of cooperation 
 
In Figure 2 below, we give an overview of the model of cooperation, (competition 
and conflict) as well of communication, we will be using in this book, In accordance 
with what has been said above, it is an activity oriented model. 
 
Figure 2. Activity Model of Cooperation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The model is to be understood in the following way. 
 
Cooperation, competition and conflict are seen as alternate modes of the 
communication and interaction in different social activities.  Thus, for example, the 
interaction in a social activity like a negotiation or a discussion could in an extreme 
case alternate between the three modes.  In this way the model captures the fact that 
the character of cooperation, conflict and competition is likely to vary depending on 
what type of activity and interaction they are part of. Cooperation in a classroom is 
probably in some ways different from cooperation in a travel agency. 
 
Manner 
Participants 
Purpose 
Results 
Activity 
 Interaction and communication 
Cooperation 
        Competition 
        Conflict 
Individuals 
Groups 
Motives 
Roles 
Motives Roles 
Instruments Objects Localization 
Physical 
Time 
Space Social 
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The model also captures the fact that cooperation, competition and conflict probably 
should not normally be seen as autonomous activities but rather as aspects of some 
activity that is engaged in for another purpose.  Of the three modes perhaps 
“conflict” is the mode that could most easily be pursued for its own sake. 
 
The factors of the model are phenomena that the activity involves on order to be 
pursued.  In semantic-pragmatic theory, they have often been referred to as 
“semantic roles” (cf. Fillmore 1982). 
 
1. Purpose(s), function(s) 
2. Participants (groups, individuals and their motives and roles) 
3. Instrument 
4. Objects 
5. Localization (physical and social) 
6. Results 
7. Manner 
 
The purpose of an activity is its “raison d’être”  - the reason for it to exist. Activities 
can usually be defined through their purpose, e.g. cooking, gardening or relaxing. 
Sometimes the purpose is not explicit but rather an implicit effect of the activity. In 
such cases, we will refer to it as a function. For example, one of the functions of 
attending a lecture might be to socialize with friends. 
 
Another very important factor influencing an activity are the participants. Any 
interactive activity needs participants.  These participants can be individuals or 
groups.  The participants have motives for their participation in the activity and 
through their participation acquire “social roles” like negotiator, teacher or travel 
agent.  They employ instruments like telephones, pieces of chalk etc.  The activities 
might have an object like “eating soup”, where “soup” is the object being eaten or 
“negotiating a salary “where” the salary” is the object being negotiated.  The 
activities are usually localized in a social institution and organization, as well as in a 
physical location. 
 
Activities have purposes like teaching students logarithms and results which might or 
might not be different from the purpose, i.e. the students might not have learned 
logarithms.  Finally the activity and the interaction is pursued in a particular manner.  
For example, teaching can be done quickly slowly, carefully or sloppily. 
 
In this book we will be using the model to primarily focus on the nature, 
preconditions and consequences of cooperation (with some consideration of 
competition and conflict) in different social activities.  In the later chapters we will 
examine some of the phenomena involved in the different “semantic roles”. 
 
 
8. Modalities of cooperation  
 
The contrast between “ what is “ and “ what ought to be “ and contrast between “ 
what is “, “ what is possible “ and “ what is necessary “ is sometimes called a 
contrast of “ modality “.  For example, in studying cooperation, we will now and 
then be faced with the with the modal contrast between questions like:  
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(i) Are people cooperating in this setting (descriptive/actual)?  
(ii) Should people cooperate in this setting (normative/deontic)?  
 
Or questions like:  
 
(iii) Are people cooperating here (descriptive/actual)?  
(iv) Would it be possible for people to cooperate here (possibility)?  
(v) Is cooperation necessary to achieve the purpose at hand (necessity)?  
 
All five questions illustrate different so called modalities.  Question (i) and (iii) are 
both about what is actually happening (descriptive). Are people actually cooperating? 
Question (ii) is normative – it concerns what people should do or what they ought to 
do.  Even if they are not actually cooperating, maybe they should or ought to.  
Question (iv) concerns “what is possible”.  Even if people are actually not 
cooperating, this question asks whether it would not be possible for them.  This 
question could then be further subdivided into normative and a descriptive variant of 
the question – “is it possible for you to cooperate?” versus “ is it possible that you 
ought to cooperate?”  Another question concerns the relationship between the two -  
Ought/ should one always try to really cooperate if it is possible to do so?   
 
The fifth question concerns “ necessity “.  When is it necessary to cooperate in order 
to achieve a particular purpose and when is it possible but not necessary to do so?  
Using the modality of “ necessity “, you may also ask what features are necessary for 
cooperation to work well or to take place at all in a particular case.  Likewise, using 
the modality of “ possibility”, you may ask what features are possible (and perhaps 
beneficial) but not really necessary.  
 
In what follows below, we will make use of all the modalities we have discussed 
above. Thus, we will sometimes discuss what people actually do (descriptive, actual 
modality), some times discuss what they think (or we think) they should/ ought to do, 
sometimes what they (or we) think is possible and finally, what they (or we) think is 
necessary.   
 
 
 9.  Methods of studying cooperation  
 
Different modalities require different methods. Basically, most research has been 
directed toward describing what people actually do when they cooperate.  The 
methods used to achieve this have been many.  For example, the following have been 
used: 
 
(i) Questionnaires  
(ii) Interviews  
(iii) Ethnographic observation  
(iv) Audio and video recordings  + transcription  
(v) Social-psychological experiments  
 
As we can see virtually all social science methods have been used. In what follows, 
we will make use of them all.  However, since our own research often has involved 
interview data and analysis of transcribed video recorded or audio recorded 
interaction, there will be an emphasis on data of this type.  In general, our attitude 
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will not be that of “ methodological purism”, rather it will be one of “ 
methodological combination”, making use of the methods which seem to make most 
sense in a given case.  This, for example, entails that while we believe strongly in the 
importance of  
“ ecological validity” and “ naturalistic data”, we do not think that such data is 
always sufficient. Often interview data or data based on ethnographic observation 
will supply a background of insight that would not be present in a particular instance 
of recorded and transcribed data.  The triple combination of recorded, transcribed 
and analyzed data with ethnographic observation and interview is therefore very 
often desirable.  Since this combination frequently is very labor intensive, we often 
will rely only on one of the mentioned sources.   
 
Turning now to studies which have a more normative perspective on cooperation, we 
first note that such studies are unusual if they exist at all. Usually such studies are not 
explicitly pursued but occur as part of a descriptive study.  Sometimes they occur 
without their author noticing that the perspective has switched from a descriptive to a 
normative stance. When a normative perspective is explicitly assumed, it is usually 
done in one of the following three ways: 
(i) Using a questionnaire or interviews to find the normative  beliefs of a 
given group of people( i.e.  a sort of descriptive approach to normative 
issues)  
(ii) Some sort of conceptual argument by the author for a given normative 
position, c.f. the ideas of “ideal communication” put forward in Allwood 
(1976) and Habermas (1984).  
(iii) Trying to find implicit norms in recordings of behavior or by observing 
what happens when hypothesized norms are broken, c.f. Garfinkel (1967).  
 
In what follows we will make use of all three of these methods. 
 
When it comes to the remaining two modalities, i.e. “possibility” and “necessity”, the 
situation is same as with regard to normative/deontic studies Questionnaires and 
interviews can be used and observations of actual behavior can also be used but by 
far, the most common type of method would be some sort of analysis where the 
author by conceptual argument would try to convince the reader of what is possible 
or necessary. 
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